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The Career and ‘Revolt’ of Gildo, 
comes et magister utriusque militiae per Africam 
(c. 385-398 CE)*
The so-called ‘revolt’ of Gildo in 397-398 was the first significant case of vio-
lent dissidence by a high-ranking western Roman officer during the reign of 
Honorius (393-423) 1 This article will re-examine his career from the perspec-
tive of the changing relationship between military and imperial authority. Gildo 
did not try to usurp the imperial power himself, nor to set up someone else as 
emperor, which had been the traditional paradigm for opposition. Instead, this 
article will demonstrate that he was rather the first senior commander in the 
western empire who tried to increase his political power by challenging the 
generalissimo, i.e. the recent phenomenon of a dominant general acting as the 
power behind the throne. 2 
* A preliminary version of this article was presented at the ‘Formative Memories: 
Accountability – Delegation – Stewardship’. Workshop at Universität Tübingen on 7 Novem-
ber 2015. The author would like to thank Kate Cooper, Conrad Leyser, Steffen Patzold, 
Sebastian Schmidt-Hoffner, and the anonymous peer reviewers of Latomus for their 
generous feedback.
1 All dates are CE unless noted otherwise.
2 For general surveys on Roman generals in this era, cf. A. DEMANDT, Magister!
Militum, in RE Suppl. XII, p. 553–790; J.M. O’FLYNN, Generalissimos!of! the!Western!
Roman!Empire, Edmonton, 1983; A. D. LEE, From!Rome!to!Byzantium!AD!363!to!565:!
The!Transformation!of!Ancient!Rome, Edinburgh, 2013, p. 81-97. For current scholarship 
on Gildo, cf. H.-J. DIESNER, Gildos!Herrschaft!und!Niederlage!bei!Theveste, in Klio 40, 
1962, p. 178-86; S.I. OOST, Count!Gildo!and!Theodosius,! in!CPh!57, 1962, p. 27-30; 
A. CAMERON,!Claudian:!Poetry!and!Propaganda!at! the!Court!of!Honorius, Oxford, 
1970, passim; T. KOTULA, Der!Aufstand!des!Afrikaners!Gildo!und!seine!Nachwirkungen, 
in Altertum 18, 1972, p. 167-176; C. GEBBIA, Ancora!sulle!‘rivolte’!di!Firmo!e!Gildone,!
in!L’Africa!romana 5, 1988, p. 117-129; Y. MODÉRAN, Gildon,!les!Maures!et!l’Afrique, in 
MÉFRA!101 (2), 1989, p. 821-872; D. GAGGERO, I!riflessi!africani!delle!usurpazioni!di!
Magno!Massimo!ed!Eugenio, in L’Africa!romana 12 (3), 1998, p. 1521-1532; C. MELANI, 
‘Mascezel’!ed!Gildone:!politiche!tribali!e!governo!di!Roma!nell’Africa!romana, in L’Africa!
romana! 12 (3), 1998, p. 1489-1502; A. BLACKHURST, The!House!of!Nubel:!Rebels!or!
Players?, in A.H. MERRILLS (ed.), Vandals,!Romans!and!Berbers.!New!Perspectives!on!
Late!Antique!North!Africa, Aldershot, 2004, p. 59-76; A. SCHEITHAUER, Gildo!und!seine!
Revolte!im!Spiegel!der!Dichtungen!Claudians, in A. HORNUNG / C. JÄKEL / W. SCHUBERT 
(eds.), Studia!Humanitas!ac!Litterarum!Trifolio!Heidelbergensi!dedicata.!Festschrift!für!
Eckhard!Christmann,!Wilfried!Edelmaier!und!Rudolf!Ketteman,! Frankfurt am Main,!
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It will show that he pursued a policy of opposition, trying to undermine 
the authority of the magister!peditum!praesentalis!Stilicho, by withdrawing his 
support to the latter during a critical campaign, thereby willing to incur the risk 
of armed conflict, yet ultimately still trying to be part of the legitimate dynastic 
framework. While Gildo’s actions at the end of the fourth century have tradi-
tionally been interpreted in radical terms, it will be demonstrated that the con-
text for his position at this junction suggests far more conservative aims.
1. Gildo’s!early!career
Gildo makes his first appearance within the surviving sources during the final 
years of the reign of Valentinian I (364-375). 3 Not much can be said about his 
early life, except that he was one of the many sons of a certain Nubel who was 
both a native Mauri clan leader and an imperial officer, the praepositus of the 
equites!armigeri!iuniores. 4 Gildo fought on the imperial side during the revolt 
by his brother Firmus, so that when the elder Theodosius landed in Africa in 
373, he entrusted him with the task of arresting Vincentius, uicarius! of the 
comes!Africae Romanus, and the two rebel leaders Belles and Fericius. 5 He is 
not attested again before his appointment as comes!Africae in 385 or 386. 6 
Hostile propaganda, especially the vituperation De!Bello!Gildonico com-
posed by the court panegyrist Claudian, has left us with a very muddled picture 
of Gildo’s career. It is important to clarify, first, to which emperor Gildo owed 
his appointment, in order to determine his allegiance in the rapidly shifting 
political context of the mid-380s and early 390s. There seem to be some links 
between Gildo and Magnus Maximus, to the extent some scholars believe the 
latter might have aided Gildo’s appointment. 7 Ammianus describes Gildo oper-
ating in association with an otherwise unmentioned ‘Maximus’, who is proba-
bly identical to the usurper since we know that Maximus did indeed serve under 
Theodosius ‘the Elder’ during his African campaign. 8 Furthermore, it is note-
worthy that the first troops to desert Gratian at Paris in 383 were his Mauri 
2004, p. 309-327; B.D. SHAW, Sacred!Violence.!African!Christians!and!Sectarian!Hatred!
in!the!Age!of!Augustine, Cambridge, 2011, passim.
3 PLRE!1: ‘Gildo’, 395-396.
4 PLRE!1: ‘Nubel’, 633-634.
5 AMM. MARC. XXIX, 5, 6; XXI, 24.
6 The date is derived from CLAUD., Gild., 154-155 which depicts an exhausted Africa 
decrying: iam!solis!habenae!bis!senas! torquent!hiemes,!ceruicbus!ex!quo!haeret! triste!
iugum!(“Twelve courses has the sun’s chariot run since first I wore this sorry yoke.”) 
Since he revolted in 397, this dates his appointment to c. 385.
7 B.H. WARMINGTON, The!North!African!provinces! from!Diocletian! to! the!Vandal!
Conquest, Cambridge, 1954, p. 11; M. TILLEY, The!Bible!in!Christian!North!Africa:!The!
Donatist!World, Minneapolis, 1997, p. 132. BLACKHURST, House!of!Nubel [n. 2], p. 67 
supposes it was a compromise between Maximus and Theodosius. 
8 PLRE!1: ‘Magnus Maximus 39’, 588. AMM. MARC. XXIX, 5, 21.
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cavalry, suggesting that Maximus’ name still meant something there several 
years later. 9 More importantly, several inscriptions attest that Maximus was 
recognized as emperor in Africa. 10 Next, a papyrus indicates that, during Theo-
dosius’ upcoming campaign against Maximus, an eastern Roman army was 
prepared to board in Egypt for a mission to Africa. 11 Finally, the panegyrist 
Pacatus claims that Maximus drained Africa during his rule. 12 
However, none of this proves that Gildo was appointed by Maximus. For 
example, that Maximus was recognized as emperor in Africa during Gildo’s 
tenure as comes!Africae proves little in itself, since Theodosius himself had 
acknowledged Maximus as a legitimate colleague c.384-387. 13 As for Pacatus’ 
remark, that may well refer to exactions that Maximus was entitled to make as 
part of the initial peace c.384-87 when he was still recognized as a legitimate 
emperor. Since the evidence for any sort of alliance between Maximus and 
Gildo is tenuous, the most reasonable conclusion, given that Africa belonged to 
the Italian praefecture, is that it was Valentinian II who originally appointed 
Gildo as comes!Africae, possibly after consulting with Theodosius. One should 
not forget that Theodosius had campaigned with his father against Firmus, and 
had probably met Gildo at this time. If nothing else, his record of loyalty at this 
time, choosing to side with the empire against his brothers surely recommended 
him to Theodosius as a man to whom loyalty meant something.
There is better evidence for Gildo’s position during Eugenius’ usurpation. 
While Claudian remains silent on his activities during Maximus’ usurpation, he 
denounces him as a traitor for not having come to Theodosius’ aid during the 
civil war with this second western usurper. 14 However, even Claudian has to 
concede that Gildo had not been openly disloyal towards Theodosius. More 
importantly, other evidence suggests that Gildo did remain loyal to Theodosius 
during Eugenius’ revolt. For example, although Africa traditionally belonged to 
the Italian praefecture, the evidence of the legal codes indicates that it took 
9 ZOS., H.N. IV, 35, 5.
10 CIL VIII, 11025; CIL!VIII, 23968; CIL!VIII, 23969;!CIL VIII, 26267. C.E.V. NIXON / 
B.S. RODGERS, In!Praise!of!Later!Roman!Emperors.!The!Panegyrici!Latini:!Intro!duction,!
Translation!and!Historical!Commentary, Berkeley, 1994, p. 505, n. 136 and H. LEPPIN, 
Theodosius!der!Grosse, Darmstadt, 2003, p. 103 see this as disloyalty to Theodosius and 
Valentinian. Nixon and Rodgers mention SYMM., Ep., II, 6 who speaks about a diversion 
of the African grain fleet away from Rome. The date is unclear, though they suppose it 
happened in 383. At this point, however, Gildo was definitely not yet comes!Africae. 
11 PLips.!I, 63 (14 June 388), cited in OOST, Count!Gildo!and!Theodosius![n. 2],!p. 28.
12 PACAT. II, 38. 
13 Maximus’ praetorian prefect Evodius was recognized as consul for 386 by the east 
(CLRE!307). Also mentioned in CTh IX, 34, 9; IX, 34, 19. Theodosius’ own praetorian 
prefect, Cynegius, even announced the joint rule of both emperors in Egypt whilst dis-
playing images of Maximus (ZOS., H.N. IV, 37, 3).
14 CLAUD., Gild. 251-257.
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orders from Constantinopolitan administrators during Eugenius’ reign. 15 Further-
more, continued loyalty is suggested by the fact that Theodosius married 
Nebridius, a nephew of his first wife Aelia Flacilla, to Gildo’s daughter Salvi-
na. 16 Jerome even reports that the marriage was meant to guarantee Africa’s 
loyalty to the eastern emperor. 17 Nor was this an unusual manoeuvre by Theo-
dosius who consistently sought to tie his senior generals to his house through 
marriage alliances. 18 For Gildo, however, it meant that his family suddenly 
became part of the imperial dynasty. Furthermore, Gildo himself was promoted 
to the status of magister!utriusque!militiae!per!Africam by 393 at the latest. 19 
Since he is the only individual ever to have held this position, it is probable that 
it was specifically created in order to induce him to remain loyal to the east during 
the conflict with Eugenius. 20
A few details help further elucidate Gildo’s position during the usurpations 
of Magnus Maximus and Eugenius. It has been suggested that Gildo was 
responsible for the victory in Sicily mentioned by Ambrose when listing Maxi-
mus’ defeats. 21 However, the fact that Theodosius sent Maximus’ head for dis-
play to Carthage after his execution suggests that he felt it necessary to remind 
15 A. COSKUN, Theodosius,!Eugenius!un!Afrika:!zur!divisio!imperii!392-394!n.Chr., 
in RSA! 32,! 2002, p. 223-236;! P. MARAVAL, Théodose! le!Grand.!Le!pouvoir!et! la! foi, 
Paris, 2009, p. 272, n. 35. The eastern praetorian prefect Apodemius (PLRE 1: ‘Apode-
mius 3’, 82-3) was given jurisdiction over Illyricum and Africa during Eugenius’ usur-
pation. 
16 PLRE!1: ‘Saluina’, 799.
17 HIER., Ep. LXXIX, 2.
18 J.H.W.G. LIEBESCHUETZ, Barbarians!and!Bishops:!Army,!Church,!and!State!in!the!
Age!of!Arcadius!and!Chrysostom, Oxford, 1990, p. 24. 
19 CTh.! IX, 7, 9: Gildoni! comiti! et!magistro! utriusque!militiae! per!Africam. The 
decree was given at Constantinople on 30 December 393, in the names of Theodosius, 
Arcadius, and Honorius. 
20 DEMANDT, Magister!Militum [n. 2], p. 719. After the reforms of Constantine I, 
the comes! Africae became the senior commander of the field army in Africa, cf. 
A.H.M. JONES, The!Later!Roman!Empire,!284-602:!A!Social,!Economic,!and!Admin-
istrative!Survey, 1964, p. 124-125; D. HOFFMANN, Die!Heeresorganisation!des!römi-
schen!Afrika!im!vierten!Jahrhundert!n.!Chr., in H.J. DIESNER / H. BARTH / H. ZIMMER-
MANN (eds.), Afrika! und! Rom! in! der! Antike, Halle, Wittenberg, 1968, p. 237-244. 
O’FLYNN, Generalissimos! [n. 2], p. 36; GAGGERO, I! riflessi!africani [n. 2], p. 1523; 
D. POTTER, The!Roman!Empire!at!Bay:!AD!180-395, London / New York, 2004, p. 551 
and R.M. ERRINGTON, Roman!Imperial!Policy! from!Julian! to!Theodosius, Chapel Hill, 
2006, p. 74 believe that Gildo already held the title of MVM!per!Africam by 385. How-
ever, given that Gildo is the only man to have ever carried this unique title, this cannot 
be taken for granted. The comes!Africae was already the highest military official in 
Africa. In the relatively ‘peaceful’ year 385, there was no immediate need to appoint 
Gildo to an even higher position.
21 AMBR., Ep.!LXX (XLIV), 23. D. WOODS, Theodosius!I!(379-395!AD), 1999, on: 
www.luc.edu/roman-emperors/theo1.htm (peer reviewed essay). To the best of my knowl-
edge, Woods remains the only scholar who has made this suggestion.
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the African provinces where their allegiance belonged. 22 In fact, the suggestion 
that Gildo did not send direct military support to the dynastic camp during the 
civil war with Maximus, helps us understand why Eugenius left him alone in 
Africa. Gildo did not recognize him as Augustus, and looked to Constantinople 
for orders, but that is as far as his opposition went. The key point is that the 
African grain fleets to Rome were never interrupted during either usurpation; 
hence Maximus and Eugenius were willing to tolerate the passive hostility of 
Gildo whilst focussing their efforts on the more immediate threat posed by 
Theodosius. But what were Gildo’s real options? A point rarely considered in 
modern scholarship is what military strategies were available to a senior com-
mander in Africa who had to choose the eastern side during a civil war with the 
imperial west. 
The position of Africa during Julian’s usurpation (360-361) provides an 
interesting precedent. The eastern emperor Constantius II sent his notarius!Gau-
dentius to Africa, and he was able to keep it loyal to the east. 23 The comes!
Africae Cretio then gathered his best units, supported by Mauretanian skirmishers, 
and used these to guard against invasion from the west. Ammianus speaks highly 
of this plan since, as long as Constantius lived, Julian was not able to take hold 
of Africa even though a strike force in Sicily was standing by to cross over if 
such an opportunity had presented itself. 24 The victory obtained in Sicily in 388 
could have been achieved by either Valentinian II’s fleet or by the army launched 
from Egypt, while Gildo probably followed the same defensive strategy as Cretio 
earlier. 25 Such a passive strategy, deemed sufficient by Constantius II in 360, 
may also have satisfied Theodosius I. 26 The most important point for now is 
that Gildo was left in peace in the aftermath of Theodosius’ victory in 394, both 
by Theodosius himself and by Honorius. This confirms their confidence in Gildo’s 
loyalty to their dynasty, at least until this point. 27
22 OLYMPIOD. Fr.!20; GAGGERO, I!riflessi!africani [n. 2], p. 1525. 
23 AMM. MARC. XXI, 7, 2-3. 
24 AMM. MARC. XXI, 7, 4-5. During the usurpation of Attalus in 409-410, a similar 
tactic was adopted by the comes!Africae Heraclian who shut down the African ports and 
guarded them with his soldiers (SOZOM. IX, 8, 37-39; ZOS., H.N.!VI, 11, 1). 
25 GAGGERO, I!riflessi!africani [n. 2], p. 1527 remarks that this does not exclude the 
possibility that the Egyptian fleet first passed by Africa, to ‘remind’ Gildo which party 
represented the legitimate side. It is not unlikely that Gildo may have lent aid on this 
occasion by letting the eastern navy harbour in Africa and sending provisions.
26 Contra!LEPPIN, Theodosius![n. 10], p. 215 who regards Gildo’s stance during the 
war against Eugenius as disloyalty towards the eastern emperor. 
27 S. WILLIAMS / G. FRIELL, Theodosius.!The!Empire!at!Bay, New Haven, 1994, p. 130, 
n. 33. CLAUD., Gild. 253f. declares that if Theodosius had lived longer he would have 
punished Gildo severely for his alleged wavering loyalty during the conflict with Eugenius. 
However, given that Gildo was allowed to stay put, Claudian omits to tell why his patron 
Stilicho had him not punished earlier. 
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2. Gildo’s!position!at!the!accession!of!Honorius
When Theodosius I died on 17 January 395, the western magister!peditum!prae-
sentalis!Stilicho publicly claimed his regency over both of his sons Arcadius 
and Honorius. 28 However, there were several problems with this claim. Legally, 
there was no such thing as a regent of a properly crowned Augustus. 29 Yet 
Honorius was a child, only 10 years old at most, who clearly could not govern 
the west himself. Arcadius, on the other hand, was already 17 or 18 and old 
enough to start ruling in his own right. Most importantly, Arcadius’ government 
and advisers strongly rejected Stilicho’s claim, and clearly did not wish to see 
his influence extend into the east. 
In 395 and 397, Stilicho organized campaigns ostensibly aimed at cowing 
Alaric’s mutinous Gothic army in Greece, and on both occasions, Constantino-
ple feared this was a mere excuse for Stilicho to march with his forces on the 
East and seize power in the capital. 30 During these critical years, however, 
Gildo decided to forsake his allegiance to the west. By early 398 at the latest, 
therefore, Stilicho found it necessary to send an expedition against Gildo after 
having him declared hostis!publicus!by the senate. Later, his court panegyrist 
Claudian also composed an epic, the De!Bello!Gildonico, depicting Gildo in the 
most evil terms. So why did Gildo desert the west, and what was the exact 
nature of his actions? Both the ancient sources and modern scholarship are 
widely divided over the matter. It is important to review both, therefore, before 
advancing a new interpretation of Gildo’s behaviour.
First, one needs to establish the correct chronology of events. As Barnes 
notes, the only secure dates for Gildo’s dispute with the western Imperial gov-
ernment are attested in early 398, when the crisis was already resolved. 31 It must 
be stressed that there were no signs of unrest in Africa in 395 and 396. 32 Oro-
sius provides two possible explanations for Gildo’s revolt:
Meanwhile the comes Gildo, who had been the governor of Africa at the beginning 
of the two’s reign, as soon as he learnt of Theodosius’s death, either motivated by 
28 On Stilicho, cf. J.F. MATTHEWS, Western!Aristocracies!and!Imperial!Court!AD!364-
425, Oxford, 1975, p. 253-283; T. JANSSEN, Stilicho.!Das!weströmische!Reich!vom!Tode!
des!Theodosius!bis!zur!Ermorunding!Stilichos!(395-408), Marburg, 2004; M.A. MCEVOY, 
Child-Emperor!Rule!in!the!Late!Imperial!West,!AD!367-455, Oxford, 2013, p. 153-186. 
29 A. CAMERON, Theodosius!the!Great!and!the!Regency!of!Stilico, in HSPh 73, 1969, 
p. 276, n. 55; MCEVOY, Child-Emperor!Rule![n. 28], p. 143.
30 O’FLYNN, Generalissimos! [n. 2], p. 28-36; P.J. HEATHER, Goths! and! Romans!
AD!332-489, Oxford, 1991, p. 199-205; M. KULIKOWSKI, Rome’s!Gothic!Wars:!From!
the!Third!Century!to!Alaric, Cambridge, 2007, p. 165-168. 
31 T.D. BARNES, An!Anachronism!in!Claudian, in Historia 27 (3), 1978, p. 498-499.!
The Theodosian Code shows that Carthage was under western control by 13 March 398, 
when the proconsul of Africa received CTh.!IX, 39, 3. By 31 July 398, Gildo was dead 
(Fast.!Vind.!Prior., s.a.!398).
32 CTh.!I, 15, 14 (issued on 19 December 395 by the emperors Arcadius and Hono-
rius) decrees that provisions must be made by the uicarius!in Africa Proconsularis that 
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envy, as some say, tried to join Africa to the eastern part of the empire, or, as 
another opinion has it, believing that there was little prospect to be had in the rule 
of two young boys, above all, because, except from these two, no boy who had 
previously been left with supreme power had had an easy journey to maturity and 
adulthood. 33
Orosius wrote about twenty years after these events and had access to good 
sources, such as Augustine, who had lived in the region during Gildo’s down-
fall. 34 He gave equal weight to both explanations and does not seem able to 
decide which one had motivated Gildo. 35 Several later authors writing from 
Constantinople, such as Marcellinus comes and Jordanes, simply rehash Oro-
sius’ account. 36 Furthermore, Zosimus, who was probably summarizing Eunapius’ 
contemporary history, refers only briefly to Gildo’s defection, with no attempt 
to explain his motivations except to say that he had been won over by the east-
ern official Eutropius. 37 While Claudian has left a lengthy account of Gildo’s 
rebellion, he is surprisingly brief as to the reasons why Gildo discarded his 
allegiance to the western court. Perhaps this was because such a discussion 
no fraud shall be committed against the grain supply. Though this looks like a fore-
boding of Gildo’s revolt, the actual law suggests standard procedure. COURTOIS, Les!
Vandales! [n. 32], p. 145 believed that Gildo’s revolt started in 396, based on CHRON. 
GALL. 452, 36. This seems very unlikely, considering the Gallic chronicle of 452 leaves 
much to desire in terms of chronologic accuracy, cf. R.W. BURGESS, The!Dark!Ages!
Return!to!Fifth!Century!Britain!The!‘Restored’!Gallic!Chronicle!Exploded, in Britannia 
21, 1990, p. 185-195; S. MUHLBERGER, The!Fifth-Century!Chroniclers:!Prosper,!Hyda-
tius,!and!the!Gallic!Chronicler!of!452, Leeds, p. 136-192. Furthermore, the year 396 was 
a rather ‘peaceful’ year in which Stilicho travelled to the Rhine where he confirmed 
treaties with client kings and recruited barbarian auxiliaries to replenish his forces, after 
having sent back the eastern Roman units at his disposal when Theodosius died in 395 
(CLAUD., IV!Cons.!Hon.!439-459; Cons.!Stil.! I, 188-240). We may seriously question 
whether the western magister!peditum!praesentalis!would have allowed any major dis-
sidence in Africa to continue unpunished for more than a year, before entertaining any 
thoughts about embarking on a second campaign against Alaric in Greece.
33 OROS., Hist. VII, 36, 2-3. Trans. A.T. FEAR, Orosius:! Seven!Books! of!History!
against! the!Pagans, Liverpool, 2010, p. 393 (emended):! Interea!Gildo!comes,!qui! in!
initio!regni!eorum!Africae!praeerat,!simul!ut!defunctum!Theodosium!comperit,!siue!(ut!
quidam! ferunt)!quadam!permotus! inuidia!Africam!orientalis! imperii!partibus! iungere!
molitus!est,!siue!(ut!alia!tradit!opinio)!minimam!in!paruulis!spem!fore!arbitratus!-!prae-
sertim!cum!absque!his!non!facile!antea!quisquam!pusillus!in!imperio!relictus!ad!matu-
ritatem!uirilis!aetatis!euaserit.
34 D. ROHRBACHER, The!Historians!of!Late!Antiquity, London / New York, 2002, p. 135-
149; G. ZECCHINI, Latin!Historiography:!Jerome,!Orosius!and!the!Western!Chronicles, 
in G. MARASCO (ed.), Greek!and!Roman!historiography!in!Late!Antiquity.!Fourth!to!Sixth!
Century!A.D., Leiden, 2003, p. 319-329; FEAR, Orosius![n. 33],!p. 1-25; P. VAN NUFFE-
LEN, Orosius!and!the!Rhetoric!of!History, Oxford, 2012.
35 MODÉRAN, Gildon [n. 2], p. 849.
36 MARCELL. COM., s.a. 398 (4);!JORD., Rom. 320.
37 ZOS., H.N.!V, 11, 2.
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would not have displayed his patron Stilicho in the best light. 38 Whatever the 
case, Claudian resorts to various stock charges against Gildo, that he was a 
tyrant, a robber, and a barbarian. He even goes so far as to style him “the third 
usurper” after Magnus Maximus and Eugenius. 39 He initially talks about Gildo’s 
seizure of Africa for himself, backed by native tribes, and only two years later, 
after the fall of Eutropius, does he admit that Gildo had actually received offi-
cial eastern recognition for his actions. 40
The one element that Claudian, Orosius, and Zosimus all agree upon is that 
Gildo transferred the African provinces to Arcadius’ government. This is what 
Gildo’s ‘revolt’ initially consisted of. Therefore, by 397/398 at the latest, some-
thing had occurred which persuaded Gildo to declare that the African provinces 
now belonged to the east, as a result of which Honorius’ government declared 
him an enemy of the state. So why did he do this? Two traditional interpreta-
tions will be discussed, before offering a third view. 
3. The!African!dimension
Most scholars emphasize Gildo’s heritage when mentioning him, whether 
describing him as ‘Moorish chieftain’, ‘African prince’, or even ‘the true heir 
of Jugurtha’. 41 Several then treat his revolt as a move towards African auton-
omy, if not outright independence. 42 Some even go so far as to style him an 
38 CAMERON,!Claudian![n. 2],!p. 102; SCHEITHAUER, Gildo!und!seine!Revolte [n. 2], 
p. 318-319.
39 CLAUD., Gild.!6, 149, 475. However, when talking about Maximus and Eugenius 
in later work, Claudian no longer seemed to have had any reason to include ‘the third 
tyrant’ Gildo (cf. IV!Cons.!Hon., 69-74). 
40 CLAUD., Gild.!160-164, 191-200, 284-287; Eutrop. I, 410-411; Stil.!I, 277-287. 
41 ‘Moorish chieftain’: JONES, Later!Roman!Empire![n. 19],!183; MATTHEWS, West-
ern!Aristocracies! [n. 28], p. 178. ‘Mauretanian chieftain’: LIEBESCHUETZ, Barbarians!
and!Bishops![n. 18], p. 24. ‘African prince’: CAMERON, Claudian![n. 2],!p. 93. ‘Maure-
tanian prince’: LEE, From!Rome! to!Byzantium! [n. 2], p. 84; MCEVOY, Child-Emperor!
Rule! [n. 28],!p. 156. ‘Numidian princeling’: A.H. MERRILLS / R. MILES, The!Vandals, 
Malden, 2010, p. 147. ‘African king’: K. WASDIN, Honorius!Triumphant:!Poetry!and!
Politics! in!Claudian’s!Wedding!Poems, in CPh!109 (1), p. 48, 61. ‘Local chieftain in 
Africa’: J.J. O’DONNELL, Augustine.!A!new!biography, London / New York, 2005, p. 219. 
‘Berber chief’: WILLIAMS / FRIELL, Theodosius! [n. 27], p. 167. ‘Grand caïd kabyle’: 
COURTOIS, Les!Vandales![n. 32], p. 145. ‘Heir of Jugurtha’: GEBBIA, ‘Rivolte’!di!Firmo!
e!Gildone![n. 2], p. 129. 
42 W.H.C. FREND, The!Donatist!Church:!a!Movement!of!Protest! in!North!Africa, 
Oxford, 1952, p. 44 speaks of Firmus and Gildo as ‘leaders of Berber particularism’. In 
a similar vein, WARMINGTON, The!North!African!Provinces [n. 7], p. 13 declares that 
“Firmus and, to a much lesser extent, Gildo represented the aspirations of the Moors.” 
COURTOIS, Les!Vandales [n. 32], p. 146 and KOTULA, Aufstand! des!Afrikaners!Gildo 
[n. 2], p. 168, following the unreliable testimony of Jordanes, also envisioned Gildo 
aiming for ruling Africa. GEBBIA, ‘Rivolte’!di!Firmo!e!Gildone [n. 2], p. 126 speaks of 
“un tentativo di separatismo”. J.W. DRIJVERS, Ammianus!on! the!Revolt!of!Firmus, in 
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usurper, 43 even though there is no evidence at all that he ever tried to become 
emperor, and such a reading seems to result from a simplistic acceptance of 
Claudian’s use of the label tyrannus for him. 44 Alternatively, it has sometimes 
been argued that Gildo was not merely a nationalist, but a ‘revolutionary’ or an 
‘agrarian reformer’ also, acting in collusion with the rural masses to expel the 
traditional Roman aristocracy from African lands. 45 Indeed, Claudian depicts 
Gildo evicting Romans from their lands and accuses him of stealing it for his 
own purposes. 46 However, this is a stock charge, not to be taken seriously. 47 
Finally, a third alleged pillar to Gildo’s nationalist African project, besides the 
Mauri tribes and poor peasantry, is his supposed alliance with the African schis-
matic group, the Donatists. 48 However, Modéran has shown that the only real 
links between Gildo and the Donatists were between him and a single Donatist 
bishop, Optatus, and these were entirely explicable in the circumstances. 49 
Modéran and Blackhurst have thoroughly deconstructed the ‘African’ image of 
Gildo. While drawing upon a rich literary canon, Claudian invoked similarities 
with earlier wars Rome had fought in the region. 50 Furthermore, he pushed the 
J. DEN BOEFT / J.W. DRIJVERS / D. DEN HENGST / H.C. TEITLER (eds.), Ammianus!after!
Julian.!The!Reign!of!Valentinian!and!Valens!in!Books!26-31!of!the!Res!Gestae, Leiden, 
2007, p. 142 claims that “Gildo’s rebellion … was also aimed at autonomy for the 
Moorish [sic] people.” Similarly, M. DE JAEGHERE, Les!derniers!jours.!La!fin!de!l’empire!
romain!d’occident, Paris, 2015, p. 105 remarks that “[j]amais les sécessions (sauf peut-
être en Afrique avec Firmus et Gildon, à la fin du IVe siècle et au début du Ve), n’ont 
été provoquées par un quelconque irrédentisme... ”.
43 P. BROWN, Augustine!of!Hippo:!A!Biography, London, ²2000, p. 226. S. MITCHELL, 
A!History!of! the!Later!Roman!Empire,!AD!284-641, Chichester, ²2015, p. 21. JONES, 
Later!Roman!Empire! [n. 19],! p. 966 even goes as far stating that “Firmus and Gildo 
were not national leaders, but pretenders to the imperial throne …”. KOTULA, Aufstand!
des!Afrikaners!Gildo [n. 2], p. 168 speaks of “der strengen Regierung des Tyrannen”. 
44 SCHEITHAUER, Gildo!und!seine!Revolte [n. 2], p. 311.
45 COURTOIS, Les!Vandales![n. 32], p. 145; DIESNER, Gildos!Herrschaft [n. 2], pas-
sim. KOTULA, Aufstand!des!Afrikaners!Gildo [n. 2], p. 168 talks about “die Unterdrück-
ung der Possessoren”. GEBBIA, ‘Rivolte’!di!Firmo!e!Gildone [n. 2], p. 126 supposes that 
Gildo’s ‘separatism’ was economically inspired: by no longer having to pay grain tribute 
to Rome, an abundance of grain could have been used by the Africans themselves, 
through which Gildo could have made massive profits and satisfy his African supporters.
46 CLAUD., Gild. 200-203.
47 CAMERON, Claudian![n. 2], p. 106; SCHEITHAUER, Gildo!und!seine!Revolte [n. 2], 
p. 312-313.
48 FREND, Donatist!Church![n. 42], p. 220-226; TILLEY, Donatist!World![n. 7], p. 94.
49 SHAW, Sacred!Violence! [n. 2],!p. 49 also remarks that Optatus’ association with 
Gildo was far from extraordinary. Optatus was bishop of Timgad, an important Numidan 
army settlement. As senior commander of the African army, Gildo probably had normal 
dealings with Optatus in this area. After all, bishops and imperial generals often found them-
selves in communication with each other, cf. A.D. LEE, War! in!Late!Antiquity.!A!Social!
History, Malden. 2007, p. 153-163.
50 BLACKHURST, House!of!Nubel [n. 2], p. 70-71.
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ethnographic stereotypes of the Mauri!much further than any author before him, 
and deliberately links Gildo’s African background with that of ‘the barbarian’ 
and the ‘tyrant’. 51 However, these labels do little justice to Gildo’s position. 
Certainly, Gildo was a Mauri tribal leader, who was able to call upon additional 
reserves of manpower for this reason. Yet neither element suffices to explain 
the origin of his revolt. 52 
Even though Claudian deliberately obscures the Roman element in Gildo’s 
heritage, the latter enjoyed much the same social position as his own patron. 
Gildo and Stilicho both have in common their ethnic heritage that became a 
label for hostile propaganda only after their downfall. During their life and 
career, both surely identified themselves as Romans. 53 Nubel and his sons had 
built up a career in the imperial army, endowed churches and proudly displayed 
their Romanitas in inscriptions. 54 Final evidence that Gildo’s ‘Berber heritage’ 
has probably been exaggerated can be found in his last hours: after his defeat 
near the Ardalio river, he did not consider fleeing to the Mauri tribes, but tried 
escaping to the east by boat instead. 55 But if Gildo’s revolt was not some form 
of proto-nationalist rebellion, what was it?
4. The!Constantinopolitan!dimension
After the praetorian prefect Rufinus was assassinated during a parade at Con-
stantinople in late 395, the praepositus! sacri! cubiculi Eutropius asserted his 
dominance over Arcadius. 56 During the period 396-399, he achieved an influ-
ence over the eastern court comparable to that of Stilicho over the western 
court. 57 He even engineered the trial and exile of two high-ranking magistri!
51 MODÉRAN, Gildon [n. 2], p. 844-847. C. WARE, Gildo!tyrannus:!Accusation!and!Allu-
sion!in!the!Speeches!of!Roma!and!Africa, in W.W. EHLERS / F. FELGENTREU / S. WHEELER 
(eds.), Aetas!Claudianea, Munich / Leipzig, 2004, p. 1-9 also demonstrates that Claudi-
an’s allusions to Hannibal and Atreus are meant to reinforce Gildo’s portrait not just as 
a political usurper, but as a debauched tyrant as well. For further exploration of the lit-
erary dimension to Gildo’s portrayal in Claudian, cf. C. WARE, Claudian!and!Roman!
Epic!Tradition, Cambridge, p. 148-170. Similarly, G. HALSALL, Barbarian!Migrations!
and! the!Roman!West,!376-568, Cambridge, 2007, p. 137 notes that “the case [of Gildo] 
nicely illustrates Roman rhetorical use of the barbarian figure and the elision of barbarians 
with brigands and other wielders of illegitimate force.”
52 MODÉRAN, Gildon [n. 2], p. 843.
53 H. ELTON, Defining!Romans,!Barbarians,!and!the!Roman!Frontier, in R.W. MATHISEN / 
H.S. SIVAN (eds.), Shifting!Frontiers!in!Late!Antiquity, Alderschot, 1996, p. 134-135; BLACK-
HURST, House!of!Nubel [n. 2], p. 70. 
54 ILS!9351; CIL!VIII 9255. T.D. BARNES, Constantine:!Dynasty,!Religion!and!Power!
in!the!Later!Roman!Empire, Oxford, 2011, p. 44.
55 BLACKHURST, House!of!Nubel [n. 2], p. 72.
56 PLRE 2: ‘Eutropius 1’, 440-444.
57 LIEBESCHUETZ, Barbarians!and!Bishops![n. 18], p. 96-100; J. LONG, Claudian’s!
In!Eutropium,!Or,!How,!When,!and!why!to!Slander!a!Eunuch, Chapel Hill, 1996, p. 1-3. 
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militum, Abundantius and Timasius. 58 Although Eutropius had originally co- 
operated with Stilicho, the latter’s second campaign against Alaric, seen as 
another hostile intrusion into eastern Roman territory, seems to have proven the 
final straw in their relationship. As noted earlier, Zosimus records that, at this 
junction, Eutropius sought and received Gildo’s allegiance. Other sources con-
firm this. For example, the law codes prove that the western praetorian prefect 
Theodorus, nominally in charge of Italy, Illyricum and Africa, only received 
decrees concerning Italy during the period of 397-398. 59 As seen previously, 
even Claudian had to concede grudgingly that Africa was temporarily lost to the 
east, and he even depicts the spirit of the late Theodosius admonishing Arcadius 
for accepting Gildo’s allegiance. 60 
While others interpret this transfer of allegiance as a decisive step in the 
direction of African independence, Cameron believes that Eutropius and Gildo 
were simply acting to their mutual political benefit: Eutropius hoped that events 
in Africa would distract Stilicho from any Balkan ventures, while Gildo “would 
naturally prefer the nominal suzerainty of distant Constantinople to the tighter 
rein of nearby Rome.” 61 However, only if we imagine this arrangement to be 
permanent is it feasible to speak of Gildo aiming for virtual autonomy. Yet 
comparisons with Africa’s position during earlier and future civil wars suggest 
caution against such a belief. Though Africa was under Constantinopolitan 
administration during Eugenius’ usurpation, it was returned to western admin-
istration after his death. 62 So even if Eutropius and Gildo had succeeded in 
destroying Stilicho’s regime, after which the east could have rearranged Hono-
rius’ government, 63 Africa would have been returned to the west realistically. 64 
Considering his twelve-year tenure as military commander in Africa, Gildo 
must have been keenly aware not only of the importance of the region to Italy, 
but also of the stakes that many Italian aristocrats had in the region. Men such 
as Symmachus possessed vast estates in northern Africa and any substantial 
58 Abundantius: ZOS., H.N. V, 10, 4-5; Timasius: ZOS., H.N. V, 9, 1-5.
59 PLRE 1: ‘Flavius Mallius Theodorus 27’, 900-902.T.S BURNS, Barbarians!within!
the!Gates!of!Rome:!A!study!of!Roman!Military!Policy!and!the!Barbarians,!ca.!375-425, 
Bloomington / Indianapolis, 1994, p. 159, 161.
60 CLAUD., Gild. 229-330.
61 CAMERON, Claudian! [n. 2], p. 93. S. MAZZARINO, Stilicone:! la!crisi! imperiale!
dopo!Teodosio, Rome, 1942, p. 265-266 regarded the friction between the western and 
eastern court at this time as “il modo d’incuneare e realizzare la sua politica di auto-
nomismo”.
62 ZOS., H.N. IV, 59, 4.
63 CAMERON, Claudian![n. 2], p. 94.
64 Similarly, after having supported Theodosius II and Valentinian III against the 
usurper Ioannes’ government in Italy, the comes!Africae Bonifatius returned the African 
administration to the west at a time when this imperial realm was in a much weaker 
condition (PROSPER s.a.!424). 
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changes in the grain supply would have had enormous social, economic and 
political consequences in Rome. 65
On a more cautious level, Blackhurst suggests that Gildo was merely “choos-
ing sides in an empire-wide dispute over power”. 66 Given his allegiance to the 
late Theodosius, Gildo had stronger connections in the eastern capital, where 
his daughter and grandchildren lived and where Arcadius reigned as senior 
Augustus. Though the presence of his family in Constantinople may have been 
a factor in his preference for Arcadius’ regime, this alone cannot have been the 
cause of his defection from the West. Oost remarked shrewdly that it is hard to 
imagine Salvina as a potential hostage who could be used against her father. 67 
By bearing her husband two sons, she had become a respected member of the 
imperial family; she was just as much an asset to them as she was to her father. 
Indeed, it is very hard to imagine how Eutropius’ regime could have endeared 
itself to Arcadius by threatening his family members in order to induce Gildo 
to act against Stilicho. 68
Blackhurst’s claim that Gildo simply changed sides in a conflict between the 
two courts certainly has its merits, since, at one level, Gildo was merely repeat-
ing his behaviour during the usurpation of Eugenius. Africa would remain loyal 
to Constantinople and take orders from its administrators. Alternatively, Shaw 
offers a slight twist on this interpretation when he contends that Gildo was 
actually a victim of the paranoid court culture in Milan, to the extent that he 
may have felt that he had no alternative than to transfer his allegiance to the 
eastern court. 69 However, neither variation of the same basic interpretation is 
convincing, for the simple reason that the tensions between east and west never 
reached such intensity as to justify what was, by any standards, a quite drastic 
action, possible in a time of open civil-war, perhaps, but not before this. In this 
case, while relations between east and west were fraught, to the extent that it 
has even been claimed that there was a ‘cold war’ between them, there was 
never any danger of civil-war. 70 Furthermore, Shaw’s depiction of Gildo as a 
victim of a paranoid court will not do either, since there is no evidence that 
Stilicho posed any threat to his position before his revolt. In 395, Stilicho 
65 On ties between Italian aristocrats and Africa, cf. MATTHEWS, Western!Aristocracies!
[n. 28], p. 25-30. BLACKHURST, House!of!Nubel [n. 2], p. 73 also believes that Gildo’s 
policy of transferring the African provinces to the east threatened to disrupt the eco-
nomic networks between Italy and Africa. While this may have been true in the short 
term, there is little reason to suppose that the arrangement would have been permanent.
66 BLACKHURST, House!of!Nubel [n. 2], p. 66-70.
67 OOST, Count!Gildo!and!Theodosius [n. 2], p. 29.
68 Contra!LEPPIN, Theodosius![n. 10], p. 149 who claims that “… Salvina mit ihren 
eigenen Kinder in Konstantinopel lebte und somit gegebenenfalls als Geisel dienen 
konnte.” 
69 SHAW, Sacred!Violence![n. 2], p. 47, n. 114.
70 A. CAMERON / J. LONG, Barbarians!and!Politics!at!the!Court!of!Arcadius, Berkeley, 
1993, p. 106, 309, 333, 408.
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immediately set out to deal with Alaric in Greece and would do so again in 397. 
Given what was at stake for Stilicho with his second campaign against Alaric, 
there would have been no worse time at which to pick a fight with Gildo in 
Africa. On the other hand, there is good evidence that Gildo did suspend the 
grain shipments to Rome in 397, and the fact that he did so undermines any 
notion of him as a victim or a passive bystander to events. 71 Since Theodosius 
I had not managed to persuade Gildo to this action even during a civil-war, one 
seriously doubts whether Eutropius could have done so purely on the strength 
of Gildo’s ties to Constantinople during a time merely of ‘cold war’. Therefore, 
when Gildo decided to transfer the African provinces to Arcadius’ domain 
and simultaneously to tamper with Rome’s annona, he was unlikely to have 
been merely taking instructions from the east. He seems to have demonstrated 
more engagement in this conflict than at any time during the wars with Magnus 
Maxi mus and Eugenius. So why was this?
5. The!western!Roman!dimension
By 397 Gildo was magister!utriusque!militiae!per!Africam, a member of the 
Theodosian family, and was second only to Stilicho in the west. Furthermore, 
he had also accumulated a substantial fortune. 72 So why did he risk all of this? 
It seems to me that his actions represent the first attempt within the western 
Roman military to topple not an emperor, but his generalissimo. To this extent, 
Orosius may well be correct when he declares that Gildo was motivated by 
envy (inuidia). It is important to emphasize Gildo’s status at this junction. After 
the battle of the Frigidus, he was probably the only western magister!militum 
not appointed by Stilicho. 73 As a western magister!militum!with a longer tenure 
71 While Claudian speaks in De!Bello!Gildonico!mainly about the looming threat of 
famine (Gild. 68-74, 102-104), in later panegyrics he mentions measures Stilicho under-
took to counter the annulment of the African grain supply, such as sending provisions 
from Gaul and Spain (Eutrop.!I, 410-415; Stil. III, 92-107). Furthermore, Stilicho him-
self publically boasted of his restoration of Rome’s annona after Gildo’s defeat in a 
dedication on the base of one his statues (AÉ!1926, 124). 
72 After his downfall a separate office, the comes!Gildoniaci!patrimonii! (ND OCC.!
XII, 5), had to be created in the imperial chancellery to supervise the extensive tracts of 
lands confiscated. Gildo’s case was not unique; one may also recall, to cite just one 
other notorious example, the case of the Praetorian Prefect Plautianus who after a decade 
of loyal service in this office to Septimius Severus was suddenly brought down in 205. 
His properties were so vast that the court needed to identify and collect them via a spe-
cially appointed procurator (ILS!1370). 
73 Contra BARNES, An!Anachronism!in!Claudian [n. 31], p. 498; M. DEWAR, The!Fall!
of!Eutropius, in CQ 40 (2), 1990, p. 582; S. WILLIAMS / G. FRIELL, The!Rome!that!Did!
not!Fall.!The!Survival!of!the!East!in!the!Fifth!Century,!London / New York,!1999, p. 10;!
BROWN, Augustine![n. 43], p. 178, 226; M.B. CHARLES, Transporting!the!Troops!in!Late!
Antiquity:!Naves!onerariae,!Claudian!and!the!Gildonic!War, in CJ 100, 2005, p. 281; 
H. MÜLLER, Preacher:!Augustine!and!his!Congregation, in M. VESSEY (ed.), A!Companion!
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than the eastern Stilicho, and a marriage tie to the ruling dynasty, he may have 
felt that he had more right to act as regent and generalissimo than he did. 74 
Alternatively, he may simply have wanted to weaken and remove him in order 
to restore greater equality between the magistri!militum as had traditionally 
been the case. 
By 397, Stilicho had only been governing the west for about two years, and 
he had not fully stamped his authority upon it yet. He was an eastern outsider, 
who had marched with Theodosius to the west and fought against the very same 
army at the Frigidus that he now had to lead himself. 75 That he had not yet 
completely established his authority over the army is demonstrated by its poor 
discipline during the first campaign against Alaric. 76 The second campaign that 
Stilicho organized in 397 is especially important when considering what induced 
Gildo into reconsidering his allegiances. If this had succeeded, Constantinople 
could have done very little to halt Stilicho should he have wished to march on 
the eastern Roman capital, thus inciting fears that Stilicho was about to estab-
lish himself as the supreme military commander of the whole of the empire, and 
not just of the west. Hence Gildo could not delay acting any longer. 
The dynamics in 397 were completely different from those during the civil 
wars with either Magnus Maximus or Eugenius. Gildo did not sit on the fence 
or wait until the last moment to pick sides: this was a pre-emptive strike. Fur-
thermore, by transferring the administration of his provinces to Constantinople, 
Gildo may have hoped to inspire other officials to act similarly against Stili-
cho’s influence. 77 There was always a possibility of war, but he may have felt 
confident that, even if this did occur, it would probably only have had the same 
outcome as the previous ones: with the eastern Roman government emerging 
victorious and re-arranging western affairs. 78 It is ironic, therefore, that Gildo 
to!Augustine,!Chichester, 2012, p. 301; WARE, Claudian!and!the!Roman!Epic!Tradition!
[n. 51], p. 72; H. BÖRM, Westrom.!Von!Honorius!bis!Justinian, Stuttgart, 2013, p. 45, 
who all identify him as merely comes!Africae at this point. This is worth highlighting 
since the notion of Gildo as comes!Africae in 397 would put him in a significantly sub-
ordinate position vis-à-vis Stilicho. 
74 Contra!WILLIAMS / FRIELL,!Rome!that!Did!not!Fall![n. 73], p. 97, who assert that 
Gildo lacked “the clear distinction of marriage and other personal ties to the imperial 
dynasty.”
75 MCEVOY, Child-Emperor!Rule![n. 28], p. 154-155.
76 O’FLYNN, Generalissimos![n. 2], p. 28-32.
77 LONG, Claudian’s!In!Eutropium![n. 57], p. 226.
78 It may be noted that such a reorganized western administration would consist of 
men who, owing their elevation to Constantinople, might very well have treated Gildo 
as semi-autonomous, depending on what was agreed upon between Eutropius and Gildo. 
The comes!Africae!et!comes!domesticorum!Bonifatius briefly found himself in such a 
scenario between 425-427 after the eastern intervention to install Valentinian III on the 
western throne, see: J.W.P. WIJNENDAELE, The!Last!of!the!Romans.!Bonifatius,!warlord!
and!comes Africae,!London / New York, 2015, p. 65-72.
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has been branded as a revolutionary by older scholarship, while the primary aim 
of his revolt was probably to restore the older style of military hierarchy within 
the west. 79
Four elements suggest that Stilicho took Gildo’s challenge to his position 
very seriously, and instigated urgent steps to suppress it. Firstly, the fact that he 
was willing to abandon his second campaign against Alaric, thereby incurring 
the odium for letting the Gothic leader escape again after having organized a 
costly campaign, proves how seriously he took this whole affair. 80 Secondly, 
the fact he was willing to send an elite strike force to meet Gildo, containing 
some of the best western Roman units, such as the Herculiani!seniores!and the 
Iouiani!seniores,!which departed from Pisa in February 398, only emphasizes 
this fact. 81 Sending a naval expedition across the Mediterranean during winter 
was incredibly perilous and again underlines the urgency of the campaign. 82 
Thirdly, the fact that Claudian composed three major works during the crisis 
(Panegyricus!de!Quarto!Consulato!Honorii!Augusti, Epithalamium!de!Nuptiis!
Honorii!Augustii and De!Bello!Gildonico)!suggests that Stilicho felt the need to 
mount a major propaganda campaign to reinforce his authority. 83!Finally, the 
fact that he arranged a marriage between his daughter Maria and Honorius at 
this point seems best interpreted as an attempt to strengthen his control over the 
child-emperor at a time that it was being dangerously undermined. 84 
79 One may also note here, inter!alea!the references in n. 40, P.G. CHRISTIANSEN, Clau-
dian!versus!the!opposition, in TAPhA 97, 1966, p. 46 who speaks of “the traitor Gildo”.
80 E. BURRELL, A!Re-Examination!of!why!Stilicho!abandoned!his!pursuit!of!Alaric!in!
397, in Historia 53 (2), 2004, p. 251-256, followed by KULIKOWSKI, Rome’s!Gothic!Wars!
[n. 30], p. 168; MCEVOY, Child-Emperor!Rule![n. 28], p. 155.
81 Herculiani!and Iouiani:!CLAUD., Gild.!421. Fleet sails in February: BARNES, An!
anachronism!in!Claudian [n. 31], p. 499, followed by CHARLES, Transporting!the!Troops!
in!Late!Antiquity [n. 73], p. 284, n. 38 and MCEVOY, Child-Emperor!Rule![n. 28], p. 157.
82 VEG., Epit. IV, 39 mentions how the sailing season usually ended in November 
because of the hazards of naval traffic in winter.
83 CAMERON, Claudian![n. 2], p. 95. The surviving source material makes it difficult 
to establish whether Claudian was under pressure to do so due to Gildo broadcasting his 
own ‘side of the story’. Nevertheless, the exposition of Gildo’s motivations in Orosius’ 
history, despite being transmitted through a hostile lens, does seem to suggest that at least 
in Africa a tradition survived concerning the regional field commander’s aims quite dif-
ferent from the characterization in Claudian’s invective. Perhaps the origin of these later 
distorted motivations stemmed from Gildo’s own circle. As early as 385, no one less than 
the young Augustine had produced a now lost panegyric for the magister!militum!Bauto’s 
consulship (C.! litt.!Pet.! III, 25). One may also note here the case of the comes!Africae!
Bonifatius of whom we do not possess any surviving panegyrics dedicated to him, but 
who was known to have employed a Gallic panegyrist (SID. AP., Carm.!IX, 277-279). From 
the late fourth century onwards, ambitious commanders frequently made use of these poets 
for their political communication, cf. A. GILLETT, Epic!Panegyric!and!Political!Commu-
nication!in!the!Fifth-Century-West, in L. GRIG / G. KELLY (eds.), Two!Romes:!Rome!and!
Constantinople!in!Late!Sntiquity,!Oxford, 2010, p. 265-290.
84 BARNES, An!Snachronism!in!Claudian [n. 31], p. 499.
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When Stilicho returned to Italy, he assigned the Roman senate the duty of 
having Gildo declared hostis!publicus. 85 However, this provoked Constantino-
ple to retaliate in kind by having the senate there declare Stilicho hostis!publi-
cus also. 86 He then assigned command of the campaign to Mascezel, a brother 
of Gildo, who was especially motivated to crush the insurrection because Gildo 
had made an attempt on his life and killed his two sons. 87 Orosius records the 
final outcome of the conflict, claiming that Gildo had 70,000 men at his side, 
while Mascezel had only 5,000, when they confronted each other near the river 
Ardalio in Byzacena. 88 However, Orosius has a tendency to inflate army num-
bers significantly, so that Gildo’s force probably did not exceed 7,000. The size 
of his army can be explained as a result of his command of the African field 
army, his ability as a Mauri prince to rally native tribes to his side, and the fact 
that he was probably also able to draw on the large manpower of his massive 
estates. 89 Indeed, Gildo had probably benefitted from Stilicho’s earlier legis-
lation spurring a recruitment drive from senatorial lands prior to his second 
Greek campaign. 90 However, Mascezel tempted several of the imperial units in 
Gildo’s army to defect to his side at start of the battle, and so won the day. 91 
85 AÉ!1926; SYMM., Ep. 4.5; CLAUD., Stil. I, 325-33.
86 F. PASCHOUD, Zosime.!Histoire!Nouvelle,!vol. 2.4, Paris, 1986, p. 114, followed by 
A. BECKER, Les! relations!diplomatiques! romano-barbares! en!occident!au!Ve! siècle.!
Acteurs,! fonctions,!modalités!Paris, 2013, p. 106 and DE JAEGHERE, Les!derniers! jours!
[n. 42], p. 288, n. 74 and LONG, Claudian’s!In!Eutropium![n. 57], p. 11, n. 46 point out 
that given the traditional conservatism of the Roman senate and its appreciation for 
archaic rituals, it makes more sense to see them first making use of the antiquated hostis!
publicus. Thereafter, Eutropius let the Constantinopolitan senate retaliate in kind by 
having Stilicho declared an enemy of the state. 
87 CLAUD., Gild. 393-398; OROS., Hist. VII, 36, 4; MARCELL. COM., s.a.!398 (4). 
MELANI, Mascezel!ed!Gildone [n. 2], p. 1495-1499 plausibly argues that Mascezel had 
already been serving the western imperial court in some official capacity prior to his 
fall-out with Gildo, based on his connections with the Nicene Christian community in 
Milan and Orosius’ statement that he in! Italiam! rediit! after the murder of his sons 
(OROS., Hist. VII, 36, 4). 
88 OROS., Hist. VII, 36, 6.
89 C.R. WHITTAKER / P. GARNSEY, Rural!Life!in!the!Later!Roman!Empire, in AV. CAME-
RON / P. GARNSEY (eds.), The!Cambridge!Ancient!History.!13,!The!Late!Empire,!A.D.!337-
425, 1998, p. 303, n. 104. The imperial government would go to serious lengths to per-
secute Gildo’s satellites!after his downfall (CTh. IX, 40, 19; IX, 42, 19).
90 D. WOODS, An!Unnoticed!Official:!the!praepositus!saltus, in CQ 44 (1), 1994, p. 250-
251.
91 OROS., Hist. VII, 36,7-10 credits Mascezel’s victory over Gildo to advice received 
from the recently deceased bishop Ambrose of Milan, who allegedly appeared in a 
dream to him. However, the fact remains that Gildo was abandoned by his regular army 
units at the start of the battle. DIESNER, Gildos!Herrschaft [n. 2], 183 and KOTULA, Auf-
stand!des!Afrikaners!Gildo [n. 2], p. 170 have perceptively argued that the most plausi-
ble explanation of Gildo’s Roman soldiers’ behaviour is that Mascezel had ‘managed 
to bribe them during the three day lull before the battle. Mascezel’s knowledge of the 
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Gildo tried to escape after the battle, but was eventually apprehended and exe-
cuted on 31 July 398. 92 
6. Conclusion
In order to fully appreciate the nature of Gildo’s behaviour in 397-398, the 
ancient historian needs to negate the benefit of hindsight. Throughout the fol-
lowing decades, one comes across several cases of commanders operating along 
similar lines in the Imperial West. Both the comites!Africae Heraclian (413) and 
Bonifatius (423-424), withdrew support to the military power-brokers at the 
western court during critical junctions, and organized armed resistance in 
response without ever forsaking the legitimate dynasty. 93 The most successful 
product of this new military generation was Aëtius who took up arms against 
the central government on no less than three occasions, yet still managed to 
maintain a military dictatorship over the western court for two decades (c. 433-
454). 94 The final culmination of this process came with the death of the emperor 
Majorian in 461, when the commanders Aegidius in Gaul, Ricimer in Italy, and 
Marcellinus in Dalmatia competed against one another for military supremacy 
without adhering to the traditional paradigm of usurping the imperial office or 
creating alternative imperial governments. 95 Yet Gildo was still a product of the 
fourth century. 
He was an officer who had experienced the strong rule of experienced  soldier 
emperors, such as Valentinian I and Theodosius I. Hitherto, a quarter century 
of military service culminating in the highest office of his diocese, combined 
with family ties to the ruling dynasty, would have made him one among equals 
in the service of the emperor, i.e. the army’s traditional supreme commander. 
However, when the joint-rule of child-emperors was established over the entire 
empire in 395, Gildo suddenly found himself in a world where the traditional 
structures of military authority ran counter to current shifts of power-broking at 
the imperial court. The long sway of Claudian’s panegyrics has often obscured 
terrain and his ties to local tribes will also have been significant factors that facilitated 
Gildo’s defeat, cf. MELANI, ‘Mascezel’!ed!Gildone [n. 2], p. 1491, n. 11. However, I am 
less persuaded by Melani’s suggestion that Mascezel’s sons had played an instrumental 
role in the defection of Gildo’s soldiers, given that they must have been dead for some 
time prior to Mascezel’s return at the head of a western field army. 
92 CLAUD., Stil. II, 2, 258, Cons. Hon.!VI, 381; OROS., Hist. VII, 36, 11; Fast.!Vind.!
Prior., s.a.!398. ZOS., H.N.!V, 11, 4; MARCELL. COM., s.a.!398 (4) and JORD.,!Rom.!320 
record Gildo’s death as suicide. MAZZARINO, Stilicone![n. 61], p. 268, n. 1 already remarked 
that these later eastern sources are not reliable for this event, cf. E. DEMOUGEOT, De!
l’unité!à!la!division!de!l’Empire!romain,!395-410:!essai!sur!le!gouvernement!imperial, Paris, 
p. 185-186; PASCHOUD, Zosime!2.4, n. 86, p. 119. 
93 PLRE!2: ‘Bonifatius 3’, 237-240; ‘Heraclianus 3’, 539-540.
94 PLRE!2: ‘Fl. Aetius 7’, 21-29.
95 PLRE!2: ‘Aegidius’, 11-13; ‘Marcellinus 6’, 708-710; ‘Fl. Ricimer 2’, 942-945.
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that the real revolutionary of the late fourth century was not Gildo, but the 
 former’s patron Stilicho who effectively monopolized all western military 
authority and entrenched it in his position as magister!peditum!praesentalis. 
Again it has to be emphasized that at no point during his ‘revolt’ can it be 
claimed that Gildo aimed for imperial power or to replace an incumbent 
emperor. As senior commander of the African field army, Gildo decided to 
tackle Stilicho, whilst simultaneously professing allegiance to the Theodosian 
dynasty. 96 Nevertheless, by taking up arms against a field army sent by Stilicho, 
while holding control over the regional field army and being supported by armed 
clients, Gildo himself became a new type of military leader which can only be 
regarded as a warlord. 97 While he ultimately failed, many other commanders 
would follow his precedent throughout the following decades. Gildo’s revolt, 
while inherently enacted by a ring-leader belonging to an older generation of 
the late Roman military aristocracy, would thus provide a brand new precedent 
for political and military opposition within the western officer class, which pre-
viously had nearly always taken the guise of usurping the imperial office.
Ghent!University. Jeroen W.P. WIJNENDAELE.
96 Contra! SCHEITHAUER, Gildo! und! seine! Revolte [n. 2], p. 309 who sees Gildo 
revolting against both Stilicho and Honorius.
97 On the phenomenon of late Roman warlords, cf. C.R. WHITTAKER, Landlords!and!
Warlords! in! the!Later!Roman!Empire, in J. RICH / G. SHIPLEY, War!and!Society! in! the!
Roman!World, London / New York, 1993, p. 277-302; J.H.W.G. LIEBESCHUETZ, War-
lords!and!Landlords, in P. ERDKAMP (ed.), A!Companion! to! the!Roman!Army, Malden. 
2007, p. 479-494; J.W.P. WIJNENDAELE, Warlordism!and!the!Disintegration!of!the!West-
ern!Roman!Army, in J. ARMSTRONG (ed.),!Circum!Mare:!Themes! in!Ancient!Warfare, 
Leiden, forthcoming 2016; J.W.P. WIJNENDAELE, Generalissimos!and!Warlords! in! the!
Late!Roman!West,!in T. ÑACO DEL HOYO / F. LÓPEZ-SÁNCHEZ (eds.), Warlords,!War!and!
Interstate!Relations!in!the!Ancient!Mediterranean!404!BC!–!AD!14, Leiden, forthcom-
ing. WIJNENDAELE, Bonifatius![n. 78], p. 120-121 qualifies Bonifatius as the first western 
imperial warlord. While Bonifatius does seem to have been the first successful!product 
of western Roman warlordism, Gildo effectively was the first one to have attempted 
proceeding in this manner. One cannot explain the success of men such as Aëtius and 
Bonifatius, without taking earlier failed precedents into consideration.
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